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marjorie perloff and vanessa place
How Poetic Is It?: A Conversation
A note from the participants: This conversation was conducted via e-mail, with Marjorie Perloff initiating most of the ques-tions and Vanessa Place not necessarily answering them in 
a straightforward way. The dialogue thus took many unexpected 
turns—a beginning again and again rather than a linear progression. 
We both found this non-method a useful way of proceeding.
Marjorie Perloff: Vanessa, in your very dramatic lecture for the sym-
posium “Lament of the Makers: Conceptualism and Poetic Freedom,” 
hosted in April 2013 by the Princeton Graduate Colloquium on 
Contemporary Poetry, you launch a strong attack, as you have for 
years now, against the lyric “I.” In what is printed as Part 3 on Harriet, 
the blog of the Poetry Foundation, you say scathingly that “the lyric 
‘I’ is the gold standard of poetry, the presumptively inflexible ingot 
that is believed to be the purest of the pure, the surest of the sure, 
the thing that both permits poetry and makes semiocapitalism totally 
legit.” But since “poetry,” from the late eighteenth century on down, 
has been, for all practical purposes, equated with lyric poetry, since 
the lyric “I” has been ubiquitous from Goethe and Blake to the pres-
ent and has been at the very heart of poetry in communist Russia as 
in the capitalist West (think Mayakovsky, Akhmatova, Tsvetayeva, 
Yevtushenko, Brodsky), why is it so objectionable NOW? When, pre-
cisely, did we start to question lyric subjectivity? Can we historicize 
the situation a little more fully? Why is lyric now related to capitalism 
and what is the geography of the lyric “I”?
Vanessa Place: I don’t object, just describe. But you are right to fur-
ther particularize; I’ve said before that history is geography, and so, 
evidently, is poetry. The lyric “I” that served to flutter alongside the 
Soviet (if not strictly against communism, against the failure of its 
utopian ideal) may be considered somewhat differently than the lyric 
“I” that beats next to the heart of the Western capitalist, and that 
might too differ from the one in Paris, where the Academy would 
regulate the meter, or the one in London, with its redress of Industry, 
Aristocracy, and Enlightenment, or the one in New York, where rank 
individualism has always carried the day. And the postmodern riposte 
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of the purer hydra-headed “I” is just so much cross-marketing. What’s 
curious to me is the embattled posture of the lyric in all this—please 
advise. My argument at Princeton was that the lyric should acknowl-
edge itself as the best articulation of the “I” that cultural capital can 
buy, and start cashing in. To pretend otherwise, that lyric here and 
now is as lyric there and then, is either dumb or disingenuous.
MP: Is the lyric so “embattled”? Or just very tired and weak? I’m still 
trying to figure out why what was possible a hundred years ago is 
so impossible today. In 1913, Mayakovsky wrote his famous Vladimir 
Mayakovsky: A Tragedy, which was, of course, not a “tragedy” at all but 
a long lyric! It begins (in Guy Daniels’s translation):
Can you understand
why I
quite calmly,
through a hailstorm of jeers,
carry my soul on a platter
to be dined on by future years?
On the unshaven cheek of the plazas,
trickling down like a useless tear.
The Futurist poets who heard Mayakovsky read this at the Stray Dog 
Café or elsewhere were enchanted. Roman Jakobson recalls that, as a 
sixteen-year-old high school student, he sneaked into the reading and 
was thrilled.
So what happened? In an essay I wrote back in the 1980s, 
“Postmodernism and the Impasse of Lyric,” I argued that it was the 
absolute distinction between journalism and “art” made by Mallarmé 
and his fellow poets that was a kind of dead end for poetry. Poets 
felt that in a mass society and a mediated culture, they had to opt for 
Literature or Life. “Postmodernism,” I wrote (I now wouldn’t want to 
use the word, but I’ll stick to the idea), “begins in the urge to return 
the material so rigidly excluded—political, ethical, historical, philo-
sophical—to the domain of poetry.” So whereas Mayakovsky relied—
brilliantly, it’s true—on metaphors and extravagant conceits for the 
expression of personal feeling, his remained a poetry of exclusion. 
And today that exclusion seems so out of date. You, for instance, are 
writing a “poetry” that allows the “non-poetic” entrance into the lan-
guage world and defamiliarizes it. But poets hang on to the Old Lyric 
as to a life raft. And the hydra-headed—the supposedly fragmented or 
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multiplex “I”—is, as you say, just a variant on the same theme. Or is 
it? Many poet-critics won’t accept this denigration of lyric subjectivity. 
In an essay for the Boston Review, Cal Bedient has recently called you 
the “spokesperson for the new cynical avant-garde,” an advocate of 
“hollowness” in poetry. How does this strike you?
VP: Like the sincerest form of flattery. What’s more interesting are 
the three threads that you have braided here, and I wonder if they 
can be teased out into another rope (from which I shall surely swing). 
First, the very specific gesture of the lyric in Mayakovsky as his great 
disavowal of the past that would combine with his desire to impose a 
“dictatorship of taste,” which was of course realized under the Soviet. 
As you know, Mayakovsky the poet is the only character with a proper 
name and occupation in the poem you cite—and the lines after the 
one you quote read:
I
may well be
the last poet there is.
Maybe so. He certainly had to shoot himself right in the heart after 
lyric smashed against later life. Second is the way that Old (and 
Newish) Lyric preserves the distinction even as it would disavow the 
exclusion. It’s not life or even thought its adherents are after, but a 
kind of masticated paste or paste-up of what life ought be, which they 
are happy as their larks to tell us, endlessly. Bringing me to the strang-
er third: the voice of the poet as such, which keeps piping throughout 
your question—the thrill of hearing a reading, the cynical spokesper-
son, etc. One of the pouts about Conceptualism is the performativity 
of its practitioners, even down to our very stylish outfits. But our bod-
ies are, as it were, ourselves. And that includes the physicality of voice: 
it is harder to dismiss Statement of Facts as not-poetry after a hearing. 
In other words, there may be something about the wild material-
ity or the “as such”-ness of Conceptualism that tosses Lyric on its 
ear. Whether it’s the overly concrete form of the written text, the 
too-Real of the content, or the too-performative mode of its articula-
tion, there’s a shot in the arm to public taste that makes most lyric 
seem rather puny and terribly precious. Any “hollowness” advocated 
therefore is simply the void that Lyric would tat up, or, to quote 
Mayakovsky again, 
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Patch up my soul
so the emptiness can’t leak out!
I just remove the patch. But this may be a thankless task to 
those on a life raft.
My question to you, then, is the historical/geographical impor-
tance of the spoon in the lapel—
MP: Touché! Your Mayakovsky quotes make your case very neatly. 
“Patch up my soul / so the emptiness can’t leak out!” would be a nice 
epigraph for some contemporary poetry books I can think of! On the 
other hand, the Dada gestures—yellow blouse, painted face, spoon in 
the lapel—have been picked up today by some of the Conceptualists 
like Kenny Goldsmith, and your “costumes,” although the epitome 
of cool, rather than Mayakovsky hot, constitute a similar gesture of 
shock and rebellion. 
But let’s leave leaky souls behind for the moment and turn to 
more immediate issues relating to your work. I have been having a 
wonderful time reading the three volumes of Boycott, especially the 
Simone de Beauvoir sections. In an interview with Andy Fitch, you 
remark that “when I started working with de Beauvoir, I felt thrown 
into some kind of ontological abyss by the easy essentialism, the easy 
gender constructs,” and indeed your transposition of gender, as in 
“It’s the dream of every young girl to become a mother” into “It’s the 
dream of every young boy to become a father,” is a wonderful send-
up of gender pieties. And I love the substitution of “ejaculation” for 
“menstruation,” as in “The first menstruation is usually traumatic.” I 
think it’s true that, as you say, “the boycotts trace this fundamental 
truth that what we really want are gender categories.” A really thick 
perception! But what would you say if I suggested that Boycott is an 
important piece of theorizing—a work of serious and sophisticated 
parody, and yet hard to classify as “poetry,” no matter how much I 
stretch the definition of poetry. So my question is why do YOU want 
it to be classified—given that classifications never quite go away—as 
poetry? Do you consider Helène Cixous’s Laugh of the Medusa poetry? 
What about Lacan?
VP: Once again, I am going to tweeze apart your question into a small-
er series. First, there is the question of what is poetry? And this alone 
raises the matter of defining an a priori poetics or Poetry. Second, the 
engagement with classification posed by Boycott itself. And third, the 
the iowa review 67
phenomenological question posed by your nominatives. So here is my 
poetic return:
What is the upshot
of all
that these words
articulate?
Not knowledge,
but confusion.
Well then,
from this very
confusion
we have to draw
some lessons,
since it is
a question
of limits and of leaving
the system.
Leaving it by virtue
of what?—
by virtue of a thirst
for meaning,
as if
the system
needed it.
The system doesn’t need it.
You tell me.
MP: Are you saying that if this passage (from Lacan, I take it) is lin-
eated, then everyone would consider it a poem? You know that I have 
long objected to that particular signpost as such. So, what is it when 
set normally as prose? But let’s move on. I just came across the most 
delightful passage in John Cage’s conversation with Daniel Charles in 
For the Birds. Charles keeps pressing Cage, criticizing him for “reject-
ing the emotions.” Cage begins with the usual rejection of ego and 
his sense that “You can feel an emotion; just don’t think that it’s so 
important.” But as Charles keeps asking the same question, Cage 
finally gets a bit exasperated and says, “But today, we must consider 
the ecology even more than the individual. . . . Instead of being proud 
of our petty emotions and our little value judgments, we must open 
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ourselves up to others and to the world in which we find ourselves. . . . 
Open [the ego] up to all experiences.” So Charles asks, “And accord-
ing to you, those experiences do not include the emotions???” Cage 
(disgusted) responds, “I see that you’re still on the level of object, 
while I am talking about process!” 
We’re still having this conversation, it seems. But why?? Why is 
mainstream poetry culture so especially regressive right now? Did 
you see that the Wallace Stevens Award, the big enchilada of the 
American Academy of Poets ($100,000) was just won by Philip 
Levine, who has himself said in an interview that his feelings were so 
strong, he wished he didn’t need words to express them, the media-
tion of words being such a drag! 
VP: They are a drag, especially his. Re: regression, it must also have 
been a drag to learn to paint and have the camera and/or that bottle 
rack pop onto the scene or sculpt and have someone come along with 
a backhoe and make a lovelier hole. And poetry culture as a whole is 
fighting for its irrelevant life, and isn’t that its own argument? There 
is something rather awful about the mastication of self duly dolloped 
into the orifices of others—but mainstream poets are no guiltier of 
this than many of those who fancy themselves experimental. At least 
the mainstream seems more or less oblivious to its politic, whereas 
the experimental is just another genre. But there is a serious issue 
here about the desire for post-Romantic poetry to articulate the Poet 
via poems compared to some earlier mandate to witness the age via 
Poetry. Two questions: is this then the difference between poetry and 
poems? And is the great destructive potential of Conceptualism its 
potential fidelity to the deadly ambiguity of the semantic as process 
and project? If I hold the mirror just so, the paper will burn.
(My poem above, incidentally, is from page fifteen of my translation 
of Lacan’s Seminar XVII.)
MP: Let’s now look more closely at what you refer to as the “deadly 
ambiguity of the semantic as process and project.” The question is 
corny, I know, but I’d love to know, Vanessa, when did you begin to 
write poetry and what was your sense of what that meant at the time? 
Which poets were you reading? Was La Medusa your first big project?
VP: No, just the first one that was any good. And Dies: A Sentence was 
done between drafts. Poetry throughout, although there was a patch 
when nothing but stabs at fact or philosophy would do. Something 
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about the law made most poetry insufferable, fiction an abomination. 
Poets of significance who come to mind: Celan, Rimbaud, Ingeborg 
Bachmann, Stein, Mallarmé, Issac Rosenberg, Lucretius, Akhmatova, 
Apollinaire. Read Dante compulsively, tailoring the translation to the 
mood of the day. Things to be read aloud—Milton, Pope, Pound. Ovid, 
and Golding’s translation of, which is terrific for Shakespeare. There’s 
no illuminating order to it, I’m afraid: because I didn’t come out of 
any particular school, I just read whatever struck me as needing to be 
read by me. 
MP: A fascinating list and provides real insight into your work. I want 
to come back to the notion, which interests me a good bit, that “the 
law made most poetry insufferable, fiction an abomination.” The 
Trayvon Martin story is a case in point: the withholding of informa-
tion and gradual leaks, the legal ramifications and arguments: it was a 
much more dramatic and emotionally charged narrative than compa-
rable attempts to “invent” such a story. Your Statement of Facts makes 
that very clear. Do you want, for Iowa Review readers who may not be 
familiar with this seminal text, to talk about this issue of fact/fiction 
a little more? What’s at stake?
VP: Your question courts melodrama—like life itself. Statement of Facts 
(and here we pierce the veil of the interview format, though that’s 
an optical metaphor and this feels more aural, while it is of course 
entirely retinal) is a self-appropriation of the narrative portions of an 
appellate brief, those sections that summarize the prosecution and 
defense testimony about the crime itself. Statement of Facts consists of 
thirty-three cantos, each concerning a felony sex offense, and is one-
third of the trilogy Tragodía. The other volumes are Statement of the 
Case, a similar presentation of the portion of the brief that chronicles 
the procedural history of a case, and Argument, which is rather self-
explanatory. Statement of Facts renders explicit the correspondence 
between law and poetry as sheer language, a correspondence that, to 
my mind, becomes a confluence. People say things in a courtroom; 
some of these things are more believable, more plausible, to other 
people in the room. These become facts. These facts are heard, which 
is to say read, by a reviewing court, which promulgates law. This law 
is in turn applied to future words in future courts, though each turn 
has some opportunity to inflect fact and law, as Eliot noted of all sub-
sequent poetry. Poetry too is language that is heard or believed and 
involves some claim to witnessing, to saying something that has that 
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qualia of law and fact, fact and law. Note that I’ve not discussed fiction 
in the slightest. Fiction makes no claim for itself on fact, and fact can-
not countenance fiction. Poetry is of course a fiction, but, like paint-
ing, its artifice is understood as part of its materiality. So some of the 
work of a work is in holding the tensions between what it is and what 
it cannot be—the flesh that seem to blush beneath the marble, or the 
way one weeps (real tears) at opera. Put another way, every medium 
or genre resists its donnée: just as a painting will shove away from 
simultaneity and fight for temporality, a poem argues for presence, 
for immediacy. And law lays claim to fact. These gestures are entirely 
game-driven: in a courtroom, Statement of Facts functions—ça marche—
while in a gallery or museum, the language weighs heavily about the 
hands. Reading in a barroom, which I have done on occasion, hangs 
many heads. And then there is the matter of outrage. 
There is also the matter of my presenting this work as “poetry” 
rather than “writing,” and that provokes another form of resistance, 
as previously noted. People tend to answer the question “what is 
poetry” by answering the question “what was poetry.”
MP: Your comment here on Statement of Facts is a very important “state-
ment” of its own, especially the notion of how things said turn into 
“facts.” But then isn’t the very transformation of “fact” in the course 
of courtroom activity itself the process we call “fiction”? Remember 
that in chapter nine of the Poetics (still my bible), Aristotle said 
that poetry is much more philosophical and important than history 
because history can only tell us what has happened—what Alcibiades 
said or did—whereas poetry deals with what might or could happen 
possibly or probably (the katholou). Now one can argue that poststruc-
turalism has taught us there is no such thing as the “what has hap-
pened,” that even the smallest factoid is called into question, but the 
notion of FICTION as imaginative writing, as invention, is not likely 
to go away. It’s been around since Gilgamesh or earlier, and it’s not 
clear to me why you are so opposed to the term. 
I would argue that if terms like “fiction” or “poetry” are no longer 
to be taken for granted for the reasons we’ve discussed, they are nev-
ertheless there and can’t be simply dismissed. You remember when 
Stanley Fish wrote his bombshell article “How Ordinary Is Ordinary 
Language?,” proving that you can’t make a hard-and-fast definition 
between “normal” and literary language. Commonsensically and 
rationally, Fish is right. But the fact is that we do, in real life, believe 
there is a difference and act accordingly; otherwise, for example, we 
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wouldn’t need to have this discussion at all and The Iowa Review would 
not need to exist and we could all be happy reading “expository” writ-
ing. So I’m asking, what’s at stake? And a related question: at this 
writing, the Poetic Research Bureau in L.A. has announced a reading 
of the work of the forty-nine poets who were cut out of Paul Hoover’s 
Postmodern American Poetry: A Norton Anthology to make room for new 
ones, including you! Evidently, there’s been quite an uproar about the 
“fairness” of the omissions. What is going on here?
VP: Differentiation is not opposition in spirit, but in kind. What 
I am underscoring here is that fiction takes its “fictiveness” as its 
given, whereas the law makes some claim on fact that is purged, by 
virtue of the fictions of the legal system, of fictiveness. Of course, we 
are talking about facticity versus fact, a distinction that has escaped 
some reviewers of Statement of Facts, who rather thickly mistook my 
engagement with the Real for a belief in a reality (and this is another 
lengthy parsing of things that may exist outside perception and things 
that mayn’t). Herzog said somewhere that “facts do not create truth,” 
and that’s as good an observation as any. So this may be my medieval 
cleric’s way of agreeing with you while arguing that the Aristotelian 
“might have been” proves Statement of Facts as poetry. What’s at 
stake, I suppose, is poetry’s understanding of itself as having some 
sort of essence, like painting had, or sculpture had. As I recall, we 
talked once about what a positivist definition of poetry would be—as 
opposed to my stance that poetry is just that which is not not poetry 
within the institution of poetry. 
N.B.: I’ve recently been reading about sound and voice and thinking 
about how the delay in these mediums is linked to the poetic delay, 
or, contrarily, to its claims for immediacy. Not so much in terms 
of the aural tradition of poetry, but rather as a way of contemplat-
ing the lyric subject, that dodo yet among us. And wondering if the 
sense of sound in poetry serves precisely this purpose: does one thus 
move from being the thinking-thing to the sounding-thinking-thing? 
Conceptualism then deferring the sound to its hearing thing, like the 
tree fallen in the forest. 
As to the anthology, it’s a bummer being a mortal bard. As for fair-
ness, this is mere madness. . .
MP: I think the case you make for Statement of Facts as poetry is con-
vincing, precisely by classical definition—a making of a new thing 
with its own ontology. What impact, do you think, has Statement of 
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Facts made on the younger Conceptualist or post-Conceptualist poets 
now writing? Are there any poets you’d like to talk about as doing 
interesting work? What do you predict for the poetry of the immedi-
ate future? And is the relation to the art world getting more symbiotic 
or the other way around? This last question is not rhetorical: I myself 
really don’t know. Sometimes it seems that the verbal and visual are 
further apart than ever, despite all the talk of interdisciplinarity. Since 
you’re one of the few people who review both artwork and “poetry,” 
I’d like to have your sense of the situation.
VP: Your last question is the most pressing and ties back to your very 
first: art still considers language capable of conveying something of the 
unadulterated (lyric) subject. I see many otherwise entirely sophisti-
cated artists treat language as a shopping cart, bearing some meaning 
or another from shelf to checkout with the unvarnished sincerity of a 
pound of ground round. And many exhibitions are described as “poet-
ic” in the dewiest of fashion. But I want art that is poetry, poetry that 
is art. Spoonier spoons. Andrea Fraser writes about the violence in 
contemporary art as being art’s violence against itself—as Art empties 
the world of representation and function in favor of form. The violence 
of Poetry is its failure to do more than dismember and remember the 
power of the speaking subject. “I” still = I, no matter how many times 
it’s multiplied. If Statement of Facts has had an impact, perhaps it is that 
poetry has been returned to its original point of violence, the violence 
of the voice: it does not originate where it emanates, it does not say 
what it says. And yet it is, and yet it does. To quote Stevens: “What 
it seems / It is and in such seeming all things are.” And this is why 
poetry is now fifteen minutes ahead of art.
MP: I concur happily with the notion of “Art empty[ing] the world 
of representation and function in favor of form”! So, now that we’ve 
reached this succinct theorem echoing Stevens’s “What it seems / It 
is and in such seeming all things are,” shall we wrap things up with 
the following question? How do you see the future of poetry/poetics 
in the coming decade? How will the kind of poetry we want relate 
to the so-called “poetry” ubiquitous on the publishing scene and in 
the creative writing workshops? In the twentieth century, the second 
decade was an age of artistic revolution: I still believe in the “rupture” 
I talked about in The Futurist Moment. Will it happen again? If so, how 
and where? 
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VP: In a fit of optimism, I want to say that we’re in it. Only our rup-
ture sounds more like a slow hiss. Something about a whimper, per-
haps. Which would be the noise of all those affably bleating hearts as 
they craft their fitted verse. The question is whether all this—the use 
of sound and social media, of institutional critique and sucking-up, 
of art and anti-art, of disruption and purposeful corruption, of all the 
tactics and stratagems that can be deployed and are being deployed to 
revolt against something, if only ourselves—will be gently absorbed 
or shaken off. And that’s simply absorption on a deferral plan. So, as 
Craig Dworkin has argued, there will be Conceptual poems by non-
Conceptual poets, Conceptual-like poetry, or -lite poetry, the emer-
gence, as you argue, of a lyric Conceptualism, that will be as terribly 
efficient as any hybrid, or it will lie fallow for a while and then roar 
up again, like Dada, like Duchamp. Like Stein. The problem is that 
when so very many bombs are thrown in so very many marketplaces, 
it’s hard to tell in the moment when there is a boom that matters. Like 
art matters, like poetry will matter. Like the matter of fact of form.
MP: I think you’re right. Some years from now we’ll be able to see 
which bomb detonated and where! In the meantime, I’ll close with 
one of my favorite Wittgenstein propositions, this one from the 
Cambridge Lectures, 1930–32:
A copy is a copy only in reference to its intention. 
Mechanical reproduction in itself can’t be wrong, and 
so differs fundamentally from intended copying. The 
expression of the intention can’t contain the inten-
tion, for language can’t explain itself. 
Language is space; statements divide space. Language 
is not contiguous to anything else. We cannot speak 
of the use of language as opposed to anything else. So 
in philosophy all that is not gas is grammar. 
A copy is a copy only in reference to its intention. There’s a notion for those 
“against Conceptualism” to think about!
